METAMORFOSIS

:::Hanya catatan kecil & kliping artikel:::

More About Me...

hanya seorang anak manusia yang sedang belajar memaknai hidup, tapi ada yang pernah bilang "jangan hanya bisa mencari makna, tapi lakukan sesuatu untuk menemukannya", dan ada lagi yang bilang bahwa manusia yang hanya berorientasi pada makna maka dia akan selalu terjebak di masa lalunya dan selalu ragu dengan masa depannya. akhirnya saya memutuskan untuk menjalani hidup apa adanya, biar lebih hidup!

Another Tit-Bit...

seseorang pernah mengatakan "kalo ada sesuatu yang bisa dilakukan sekecil apapun, jika diawali dengan baik mungkin hasilnya akan besar"

Showing posts with label Ekonomi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ekonomi. Show all posts

Social Entrepreneurship, the Creativity Economy, and Reciprocity: Investing in a Better World

Since 1987, Echoing Green has provided seed funding and support to more than 450 social entrepreneurs with bold ideas for social change in order to launch groundbreaking organizations around the world. Echoing Green was established by the senior leadership of General Atlantic, global growth investors, to pioneer the strategy of applying entrepreneurial principles to social sector investing.

Echoing Green’s very broad portfolio includes the Reciprocity Foundation, founded by Adam Bucko and Taz Tagore to enable homeless and high-risk youth and young adults to permanently exit the social services system and start meaningful, sustainable careers in the creativity economy, including fashion, design, marketing, and pubic relations. Reciprocity seeks to expand beyond New York to build a national network of programs to enable homeless youth to enroll in college, secure hands-on work experiences and build professional relationships in their fields.

A young start-up, Reciprocity has already placed students in jobs and internships at such leading companies as Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Chaps Ralph Lauren/Warnaco, Young and Rubicam, and America’s Next Top Model; students are prepared for interviews by Katzenbach Partners LLC. Students have gained admission to numerous colleges, and Reciprocity and LaGuardia Community College are partnering on an innovative venture to advance students’ success. Reciprocity has been featured on ABC, CBS, and Reuters, as well as in the New York Times and other global and national media.

Reciprocity’s students designed the graphics for Reciprocity’s own logo representing strength and humility, the organization’s brand new fundraising campaign featuring bags with the logo “Homeless Not Hopeless,” as well as the centerpieces for Fast Company’s Social Capitalist Awards in 2006.

In social psychology, religion, and even game theory, the term reciprocity represents the ideal that positive actions will inspire reciprocal positive actions. What better way for social entrepreneurs to invest in the future of the world.

| posted by Alice Korngold : fastcompany.com

GLOBAL BANKING



The Credit Crisis that has hit the world has impacted the world’s financial institutions. The lack of liquidity and trust in financial institutions is just starting to trickle down and impact “main streets” in countries around the world. Governments around the world have decided to start nationalizing banks and to insure a wider range of their transactions to restore trust amongst banks.

The world of global banking is complex, with many different partners, each playing its own role in keeping the local, national, and global economy running smoothly. There is no one set of rules governing global banking, but a patchwork of national and sometimes regional regulations. Despite the lack of an international body in charge of oversight, many state banks are working together to coordinate their responses to the credit crisis.

This analysis will examine the roles and function of different types of banking, discuss some of the challenges facing the global banking system, and highlight existing regulations that govern global banking.

Types of Banks
Commercial Banks
There are many different types of types of banks, including, commercial banks, retail banks, community banks, saving banks, offshore banks, Islamic banks, development banks, private banks, and others. However, many banks have multiple divisions offering services in multiple sectors.

Commercial banking takes place in the home country, in the greater region, and around the world. The structure of international banks includes: a headquarters and branches in the home country (collectively known as the parent bank) and subsidiaries (with their own legal entity) in their home countries and it other countries.1

Commercial banks make money from fees associated with different types of accounts and services, buying and selling corporate and government bonds, selling their loans (car loans, mortgages, student loans, etc) and the associated insurance (credit swaps) to other financial institutions, and by investing in debt securities. The leveraged debt ratio for commercial banks varies by country and by institution, but, in general, the rates are much lower for commercial banks than investment banks

Investment Banks
Traditionally the difference between investment banks and commercial banks was that investment banks used to be limited to “capital market” activities, such as investments and insurance services, while commercial banks, which accepted deposits and gave loans, were housed in separate institutions. However in 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was passed in the U.S., allowing banks to have investment divisions and commercial divisions.2

Investment banks offer strategic advice on mergers and acquisitions, divestitures, and other financial services, including trading in derivatives, fixed income foreign exchange, commodity and equity services.

Many investment banks offer “buy” and “sell” side services. “Sell” services include trading securities for cash or securities and under-writing investments. “Buy” services include dealing with mutual funds, pension funds, and hedge funds.

The last top-tier US-based, investment banks, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley decided to change over to bank holding companies, which will allow them to create commercial bank subsidiaries.

Government Banks and Quasi-governmental banks
Most countries have a central banking system. Most central banks are fully independent; they set their own policy goals (although some do so in concert with government departments/ministries), determine the best way to carry out their goals, and run their own operations without too much government interference. Some central banks have private members, such as the U.S. Federal Reserve system.

The roles of a central bank include:

  • preventing banking panics and maintain the stability of the banking sector;
  • supervising the bank industry, such as regulating bank holding companies and protecting credit rights of consumers;
  • managing the nation’s money supply by issuing and distributing its currency;
  • developing the country’s monetary policy by addressing topics such as interest rates and subsidized loans;
  • providing financial services to the government and foreign official institutions, such as maintaining the country’s payment system and buying and selling government bonds and treasury notes; and,
  • acting as a lender of “last resort” to banks and financial institutions.

Bank for International Settlements
Central banks turn to the Bank for International Settlements, an international organization, to serve as their central bank. The BIS provides a forum for discussion amongst central banks and policy analysts, provides economic and monetary research, serves as counterparty for central bank transactions, and serves as an agent or trustee in international financial operations.3 BIS deals with international banking regulations, through the development of the Basil Concordat and Basil II, discussed below.

Banking Cycles
A 2008 McKinsey Quarterly report describes the natural ebbs and flows that exist in global banking. 2006 saw historic highs for global, after-tax profits for banking reaching $788 billion, up from $372 billion in 2000. The profits for U.S. Banks in 2006 were larger than the combined profits of retailing, pharmaceutical, and automotive industries. Both this level of growth and prosperity is unsustainable.

Similar “busts” took place on “Black Monday” in 1987, and the “Dot-Com” bust of 2001. Despite these past busts, the fundamentals of global banking remained strong. In this report, McKinsey predicted that banking profits and revenues would double by 2016.4

Nonetheless the current crisis is deeper and even more challenging than all recent crises, and many banking fundamentals may change because of it. The nationalization of banks, while considered necessary, is a fundamental change to the system of privatization, supported by most international monetary institutions.

General Challenges Facing Global Banking
There are many challenges facing the banking industry, the most imminent is the current credit crisis, but other issues such as unregulated hedge funds and money laundering are also of concern.

Credit Crisis
The credit crisis affecting banks around the world can be traced to the subprime mortgage crisis (link the G101 article). Banks have these toxic loans and have sold these toxic loans to other financial institutions, hence the crisis is not just hitting banks, but any company who buys and sells derivatives of these toxic loans. Since no one knows the values of these loans and how many more homes will foreclose, banks are wary of lending money to companies, consumers and to each-other, which can be described as a crisis in liquidity.

An additional element of this crisis is tied to credit default swaps, in which insurance policies for loans are sold, aggregated, and resold. The trillion-dollar credit default swap crisis-in-the-making, has yet to be addressed.

In response to this crisis, G-8 countries have pledged to inject capital into the top tier banks in their countries, thus allowing them to start making loans and address the liquidity aspect of this crisis.

Hedge funds
There are about 900 hedge funds worldwide, which are managing $1.2 trillion dollars in investments. These funds trade in secondary debt, which they buy from banks and corporations. Acting as middlemen, they repackage the debt into new securities and sell them. Hedge funds are also originating loans as well, which can lead to conflict of interest. Many hedge funds have extremely high leveraged debt ratios; they are not regulated and take higher risks than banks and other financial institutions.5

When markets are down and hedge funds have extremely high leveraged debt ratios, such as 30:1, then when they are not able to make back the processes, they are forced to close.

As credit is drying up, many small businesses are turning to hedge funds, rather than banks, for their loans. This furthers the downward cycles facing banks who are worried about lending. Major concerns for hedge funds are investor protection and systemic risk.
.
Money-laundering
Money –laundering is a huge challenge faced by many banks around the world. About $500 million to $1 trillion dollars is laundered every year; it is estimated that half of that money comes from the U.S. This number is larger than the banking needs of nearly every legitimate industry. Laundering is often done through private banking and correspondent banking; most major banks have been accused of laundering during the past decade.6

Heavy fines are levied against banks found guilty of laundering money. There is no set of global anti-money laundering (AML) regulations, each country has its own rules and regulations; thus compliance is difficult given the worldwide range of AML regulations.

Some compliance laws address due diligence (US), while others focus on maintaining information on clients and their transactions and then submitting this information to auditors and other oversight mechanisms. Other AML regulations focus on the role of the front office in battling laundering, since they tend to know their clients better. In the U.S., the Federal Financial Institutions Examiners Council (FFIEC) provides a set of guidelines to address client interactions.

Other tactics include the use of AML software to monitor accounts. Expenses for AML software is expected to reach $375 million, by 2009.7

Patchwork of Regulations
National regulations often cover bankruptcy laws, anti-discrimination rules, disclosure rules, required reserve levels, consumer protections for electronic fund transfers, rules concerning giving credit to insiders, notification requirements on privacy issues, rules on interest on deposits, rules concerning credit extensions and restrictions to brokers and dealers, fair credit reporting requirements, bank acquisition policies, rules on non-banking activities, consumer complaint procedures, fund withdrawal availability, and others.8 National deposit insurance programs also vary from country to country, although these programs are often bypassed during a government bail-out program.9

In an effort to harmonize banking regulations across the globe, the BIS passed the Basel Concordat of 1975, which addressed regulations of internationally-based banks by the host country. It focuses on the system of communications and coordination amongst national regulators. It was substantially revised in 1983 to include the concept of consolidated supervision and supplemented in 1990 to include recommendations on supervisory collaboration, amongst other measures.10

In 2004, after the Asian financial crisis, regulators passed Basil II Principles to further harmonize different country’s banking regulations and to devise a set of common rules.11 Basil II was only put into action within the last year and is not expected to be phased in the U.S. until 2009. Basil II will require banks to match the size of the capital cushion based on the riskiness of their loans and securities. Basil II puts a larger burden on bank shareholders, who will have to absorb losses before the depositors or taxpayers are burdened. The riskier the loan, the larger the buffer required by shareholders.12

There are a number of weaknesses with Basil II. Some believe Basil II contributed to the current crisis, since banks found ways around the system by taking risky loans off their books through securitizing and selling them, thus decreasing the buffer amount. The lack of transparency of banks makes it very difficult to fix the credit crisis, since it is hard to estimate the depth of the problem associated with mortgage crisis.13

Under Basil II, banks have misjudged risk, therefore further miscalculated the needed capital cushion. Basil II also relies on current market prices for assessing risk vs. using historical data. Overseers of Basil II state that instead banks can estimate average risk based on historical data. This contraction of interpretation must make it difficult to carry-out.14

Some banks view Basil II as problematic because it may lead to less lending overall, causing a downward spiral in economy. In a downturn, there may be few shareholders willing to invest, thus the banks fail or are merged with stronger institutions. Supporters believe Basil II is an important step to increasing financial oversight, insuring trust in institutions, and decreasing the need for a taxpayer bailout.15

Looking Forward
In response the financial crisis, bank nationalization is taking place around the world. As a first step to recovery, the G-8 countries and additional European countries have provided large amounts of extra capital to banks to guarantee new loans. Soon discussions will address the issues of toxic loans and other financial institutions. These measures are widely touted as necessary and as the right step to move forward.

Yet other factors loom on the horizon. What will be the effect of all this new capital on the global economy? The basics of inflation tell us that if more money is printed or made available, the value of that money decreases. When billions of dollars are flooded into the banking system, inflation is bound to occur at some point. There are normal cycles of inflation and deflation within an economy, periods of growth and periods of contraction. Going too far in either direction is not a good idea. Policymakers are correct in their need to prevent a major-worldwide depression, with all available tools; hopefully they are thinking about long-term outcomes as well as short-term.



1 Haines, Cabray and Calvin Ho. “Global banking and national regulation: A conference summary.” Chicago Fed Letter. ESSAYS ON ISSUES MARCH 2007 NUMBER 236b. http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflmarch2007_236b.pdf
2 http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-investment-banking.htm
3 “About BIS.” Bank for International Settlements. http://www.bis.org/
4 Dietz, Miklos, Dietz Robert Reibestein, and Cornelius Walter. “What’s in store for global banking.” The McKinsley Quarterly. January 2008. http://www.mckinseyquarterly.com/Economic_Studies
/Productivity_Performance/Whats_in_store_for_global_banking_2095
5 “Global Banking Industry Outlook: Issues on the Horizon 2007.” Deloitte. http://www.deloitte.net/dtt/cda/doc/content/
me_global_industry_outlook_2007_banking.pdf
6 Petras, James. “US Bank Money Laundering - Enormous By Any Measure.” Rense.com. September 1, 2002. http://www.rense.com/general28/money.htm
7 “Global Banking Industry Outlook: Issues on the Horizon 2007.” Deloitte. http://www.deloitte.net/dtt/cda/doc/content/
me_global_industry_outlook_2007_banking.pdf 8 http://www.bankersonline.com/abcsoup/abcsoup.html
9 Haines, Cabray and Calvin Ho. “Global banking and national regulation: A conference summary.” Chicago Fed Letter. ESSAYS ON ISSUES MARCH 2007 NUMBER 236b. http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflmarch2007_236b.pdf
10 Wood, Duncan. Governing Global Banking. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2005
11 Ibid.
12 Coy, Peter. “How New Global Banking Rules Could Deepen the U.S. Crisis.” Business Week. April 17, 2008. http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/
08_17/b4081083014665.htm
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid. 1 Haines, Cabray and Calvin Ho. “Global banking and national regulation: A conference summary.” Chicago Fed Letter. ESSAYS ON ISSUES MARCH 2007 NUMBER 236b. 2 3 “About BIS.” Bank for International Settlements. 4 Dietz, Miklos, Dietz Robert Reibestein, and Cornelius Walter. “What’s in store for global banking.” . January 2008. 5 “Global Banking Industry Outlook: Issues on the Horizon 2007.” Deloitte. 6 Petras, James. “US Bank Money Laundering - Enormous By Any Measure.” Rense.com. September 1, 2002. 7 “Global Banking Industry Outlook: Issues on the Horizon 2007.” Deloitte. 8 9 Haines, Cabray and Calvin Ho. “Global banking and national regulation: A conference summary.” Chicago Fed Letter. ESSAYS ON ISSUES MARCH 2007 NUMBER 236b. 10 Wood, Duncan. Governing Global Banking. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 200511 Ibid. 12 Coy, Peter. “How New Global Banking Rules Could Deepen the U.S. Crisis.” . April 17, 2008. 13 Ibid.14 Ibid.15 Ibid.
(globalization101.org)

How to Fix Financial Reporting?


On Nov. 15, finance ministers from the 20 wealthiest countries are scheduled to convene in Washington, D.C., to discuss what could amount to a comprehensive overhaul of the global financial system. The alarming speed with which the credit crisis has spread from toxic mortgage-backed assets in the U.S. to banks as far afield as Iceland, Russia, and Korea certainly calls for a radical rethinking of how these markets are set up and regulated.

How far-reaching such a structural makeover turns out to be is anyone's guess, but one issue that demands attention sooner rather than later: strengthening the rules that govern how publicly traded companies report financial information. Strictly speaking, the financial crisis erupted from risky investments that have tainted the balance sheets mainly of banks and other financial institutions. But the crisis of confidence, some believe, is pervasive and extends to confusing accounting practices applied by a much broader universe of companies. Investor confidence in the markets hangs in the balance until financial transparency and disclosure are significantly improved.

The core of the problem is the failure of many companies to provide a complete and accurate depiction of their financial standing, which is reflected in deficient disclosures of asset values, liabilities, and overall risk on corporate balance sheets. Even as financial analysts and regulators have called for increased transparency, the banks at the center of the credit crisis have stepped up requests that fair-value accounting for impaired assets be suspended to allow the credit markets to loosen up.

(By David Bogoslaw : BusinessWeek.com, 10/15/08).

Global Accounting

Many blame a simple accounting rule known as “mark-to-market” as a contributing factor to the financial crisis. As banks and corporations are facing huge losses and potential bankruptcy, understanding the role of accounting and it associated system of global rules is helpful for understanding how companies divulge their finances.

One would think accounting would be a simple profession. In theory all one needs to do is record every financial transaction as a debit in one account and as a credit in another. The sums of all the credits should equal the sum of all the debits. This basic system of double bookkeeping has been used for thousands of years, since the times of ancient Rome. The role of accounting standards is to provide a set of rules defining how institutions report their profits and losses.

Oversight for accounting is done through auditors. Auditors are responsible for interpreting the accounting standards and deciding whether institutions have accurately presented their financial information. Internal auditors (usually employees of the institution) examine financial information for use by management. External auditors (always an independent outside firm) examine an institution’s financial statements to ensure that they are truthful and fair. The big four auditing companies worldwide include Deloitte Touche Tohmahtsu, Ernst and Young, KPMG, and PriceWaterhouse Coopers. These firms work with local, partner institutions in many countries worldwide.

Recently, the field of accounting has adopted dramatic measures that integrated accounting standards worldwide. In 2007, the United States joined approximately 100 countries in its acceptance of the London-based, International Accounting Standards Board’s (IASB) International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) standards. Until then, the U.S. only used the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) standards. The new standards will be phased in for all companies in the next five to ten years; albeit some major corporations will be able to start using the new accounting system as early as 2009. The IASB expects that within five years, 150 countries will have signed onto the IFRS.

The main difference between the two systems of accounting is that the IFRS is principle-based and the GAAP is rule-based. Auditors will need to understand the purpose of each transaction, to check whether the accounting fits the related IFRS principles. For example, when examining a company’s lease of a piece of machinery, auditors will need to determine if the company intends on owning the machinery (thus counting it as an asset) or if the company intends to return the machinery (expense). This disclosure of the purpose of machinery or more importantly technology may conflict with a company’s trade secrets and its desire to keep its potential future products secret.1

There are many positives associated with having one worldwide accounting standard, including “a decreased cost of capital, greater mobility of capital, greater efficiency in the allocation of resources, improved and more comparable financial reporting, and a decrease in the opportunities for earnings management.”2 Multinational companies now only have to keep one set of accounts, which makes it easier for investors to compare companies.

There are also many challenges associated with adopting the new standard. Different interpretations may arise from auditors from different countries and by different auditing bodies. How are these different interpretations resolved?3 Others worry about increased lawsuits due to different interpretations. In the developing world, challenges include changing legal, regulatory, and economic structures to comply with IFRS accounting rules, as well as challenges associated with the “culture” of Western-oriented accounting principles.

For example, the United Arab Emirate’s (UAE) banks, companies listed on the UAE’s new stock exchange, and the Dubai International Foreign Exchange must abide by IFRS standards in order to attract for capital. To prepare to comply to IFRS standards, the UAE has overhauled its legislation, courts, regulatory environments, and regulators. The Big Four accounting firms all set-up offices in the UAE, which helped drive the country’s adoption of the standards. The UAE has had problems implementing the standards due to a local culture of secrecy, in which companies are not used to reporting their financial earnings. Money laundering is also quite common in the UAE, thus making it difficult to supply the needed financial information for accounting purposes.4

One of the controversial tools used by accountants is the Mark-to-market methodology, in which a financial instrument is valued based on the current market price, rather than historical or future prices (for example a bond that is set to mature in six months, but is valued at its current price). This particular type of accounting can have major consequences in certain fields, such as futures trading, in which accounts can be “marked daily” and the trader will make or lose money accordingly. Fraud can occur when the value is not objectively determined. During the recent U.S. hearings on the $700 billion financial bailout, lawmakers considered suspending mark-to-market rules for financial corporations who were having difficulty assigning a value for the mortgage-backed securities. Potential losses associated with these securities would be extremely high as companies would have to admit that their investments were worth very little.

The current financial crisis further highlights to problems associated with accounting. As noted in a David Bogoslaw in Business Week “The core of the problem is the failure of many companies to provide a complete and accurate depiction of their financial standing…”5 Many companies have not assigned the proper value to their assets, thus projects a false image of their health. The IFRS and GAAP rules determine how a company projects its financial health; hence they play an extremely important role for investors and regulators. Moving forward, regulators and auditors will need to work together to ensure that companies and institutions provide an accurate picture of their financial health. (globalization101.org)

Behind the Financial Crisis: Causes and Fall-outs


The world watched as the U.S. financial system failed, comparable to stock market crash of 1929, the days of Wall Street’s Investment Banks are over.

Investment banks and brokerage firms make money by buying and selling stocks and bonds, helping companies go public, issuing new stocks or bonds, and by creating investment vehicles for customers (such as aggregating and repackaging loans of all types). Everything is fine as long as there is something to sell customers and that there are customers to buy the products that these firms create.

The summer of 2007 saw the start of the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, Americans could no longer afford their adjustable rate mortgages and their over-priced homes; the loan defaults and foreclosures began. The difference between this real estate bubble and the ebbs and flows of real estate in years past is that these loans, including the subprime loans, were repackaged and sold widely as low-risk investments and became sources of capital for many of the investment banks and brokerage firms, who then sold them again to investors interested in making money with high yields and low risk. The crisis that hit Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, AIG (as well as Fannie Mae), was that there were no buyers for the repackaged sub-prime loans and no place to unload the debt that these companies incurred.

Making matters worse was the use of borrowed funds or “leverage,” in which these companies borrowed huge amounts to buy stocks/securities/other investments, and then when they sold these investments for a profit, they made exorbitant amount of money. In 2007, Lehman had $700 billion in investments; its shareholders investments (equity) was about $23 billion, the rest of the funds were supported by borrowing, a “leverage” ratio of 30:1. The use of leveraged funds provides a huge incentive to focus on short-term profits, which fueled the buying of the subprime mortgages. At one point, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac had leverages of 60:1. The use of leveraged funds backfired when these investments could no longer be sold.1

The failure of the subprime market though is only one of the many contributing factors. While the full-picture might not unfold for years, there are other known contributing factors, such as credit default swaps, to the current financial crisis.

The Role of Credit Defaults Swaps (CDS)

Credit default swaps work similarly to insurance contracts, which cover losses on certain types of securities, such as municipal bonds, corporate debt, and mortgage securities, when the institution taking out the debt defaults. The institution/person that buys the credit default insurance pays a premium in return for default coverage. Any institution can buy these contracts, even if they were not the ones to take out the debt. These contracts can be “swapped” or traded, without knowledge that the buyer actually has the resources to pay off the contract in case of default.

Unlike insurance policies, credit swaps are not regulated, are often done in private deals, and may go through as many as 15-20 trades. Again, similar to the sub-prime crisis, risk is very hard to assess and the values of these “credit default swaps” are hard to measure.2

A mid-2007 estimate puts the CDS market at $45 trillion dollars; commercial banks this time are the main holders of CDSs, with the top 25 banks holding $13 trillion in CDSs. The banks acted as both the insured and the insurer. The reason this market ballooned was because this money was viewed as easy money, with premiums coming in, and low expectations that they would have to be paid out.

The failure of subprime market, will hit the CDS market hard because there is so little transparency about the holders of these contracts and their abilities to pay off the debt. The failure of AIG, Bear Stearns, and many of the other recent failed financial institutions is tied to their CDS holdings. The fall-out of a CDS crisis will have huge repercussions. Loans will be even more difficult to get, since banks will not readily provide default insurance. Companies, municipalities who raise capital by bonds and other debt mechanisms will have problems raising money.3

The repercussions of the financial crisis

The worst-case scenario that is mentioned is depression, which could be as bad as the U.S. Great Depression! Since the U.S. government will try its hardest to avert this level of crisis, $700 billion dollars will most likely be given to bail out financial institutions in trouble, albeit with some caveats. Then what?

The U.S. financial system will be re-organized. Already Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley will have commercial bank branches, which will raise capital through individual accounts. These banks will have to follow specific investment rules, such as lower leverage. The marriage of brokerage firms, investment banks, and commercial banks, will change the number and type of investment instruments available to the public and to institutions who want to raise funds.

Start-ups and small companies will have hard times raising money, since they will be viewed as risky. Investments that are not FDIC-insured may fail. Overall, there will be less liquidity, so fewer loans to individuals and to companies and the loans which will be given, will have higher interest rates attached.

The U.S. economy will slow. Less money will be available for aid, for non-profits, for service industries that rely on wealthy consumers to support them, and, of course for homes. Since the U.S. financial system is globalized, economies around the world will slow as well. The Russian Stock market already fallen 55 percent and the Chinese stock market fell by 48 percent.4

Many countries may choose a different currency for their reserves, if faith is lost in the dollars value. At the end of 2007, $9.4 trillion dollars of dollar-dominated securities were being held by foreign investors.5 If the dollar loses its reserve status, then gold may be a beneficiary. The British pound used to be the currency of international transactions, two world wars reduced its value and slow growth led to interest in other currencies, such as the U.S. dollar.

Moving Forward

A U.S. government bail-out is crucial. It will hopefully stave off the most dire consequences. But it will be just the first step to increasing transparency of the inner-working of the financial world. Policy and regulation is needed to make sure that the CDS market is cleaned up soon, so that it does not further destabilize the world economy.

Eventually, the other root cause of this crisis, the sub-prime loans and the decreasing value of real estate will need to be addressed, so that more home foreclosures do not further weaken the financial system.

Some recommend decreasing the leverage ratios permitted by companies, thus further decreasing risk from financial markets. Some risk will always be a part of the system, but it must be properly assessed and transparently reported.

Many Americans balk at their tax-money being used to bail out these institutions and to taking on the risk associated with these bad loans. But as many pundits note, the alternative is worse. (globalization101.org)

G-20 Declaration Calls for Completion of WTO Doha Round that Includes Further Financial Services Deregulation: Ignorance or Cynicism?


G-20 Leaders Fail to Address Existing Radical WTO Financial Service Deregulation Requirements that Conflict with Summit Reform Proposals

Simillar Page :

GTW press release on the eve of the Nov. 15 summit

Reporter's memo on WTO role in financial crisis (PDF)

November 12th GTW press release on the G-20 summit

GTW backgrounder on the WTO role in the financial crisis

WTO coverage at Eyes On Trade

More on the WTO

AddThis

WASHINGTON, D.C. - The failure of world leaders today to require significant changes to existing World Trade Organization (WTO) rules that lock in domestically and export worldwide the extreme financial services deregulatory agenda that fostered the global economic crisis seriously threatens proposed solutions, Public Citizen said. The summit statements call for completion of the Doha Round of WTO expansion is maddening, given one of the three core pillars of the agreement is further service sector deregulation and liberalization, including financial services.

"Only ignorance or extreme cynicism can explain why the summit not only failed to address the existing radical WTO financial service deregulation requirements that conflict with many of the most basic remedies to fix the mess and avoid future meltdowns, but called for a new Doha Round WTO expansion agreement a core aspect of which is further financial services deregulation and liberalization," said Lori Wallach, director of Public Citizens Global Trade Watch division.

The G20 call for countries to strengthen their domestic financial service regulations and also work towards regulation of the world's major cross-border financial institutions fails to recognize that 105 of the world's nations have taken binding WTO Financial Service Agreement commitments to stay out of the business of regulating multinational financial service firms.

"Because they don't address the radical financial services deregulation agenda that has been aggressively promoted and entrenched by the WTO, the proposals emerging from this summit will simply NOT solve the problem," Wallach said. "Given president-elect Obama is savvy to the problem of trade agreements undermining domestic regulatory space and the Democratic platform includes resolving the overreach of trade rules that limit non-trade regulatory space, hopefully the next U.S. administration will be able to chart a new course and bring the change we need to the global financial architecture."

Despite the pervasive role of the WTO in worldwide financial service deregulation, the primary comments regarding adherence to global trade rules made by world leaders and commentators before and during the global financial crisis summit were of the red herring variety: panicky warnings about the perils of countries raising tariffs to block imports in response to dire economic conditions - something no country has proposed.

"Altering the WTO financial services rules is critical for creating domestic policy space to address the crisis," Wallach said. "However, even in the face of this crisis, the United States and the European Union are pushing for further financial services liberalization in the ongoing WTO Doha Round, the conclusion of which they are now pushing as a cure to the crisis, even as they find that flaunting the existing WTO terms is the necessary course of action."

As part of its original WTO commitments, the United States agreed to conform a broad array of financial services - including banking, insurance and other financials services - to comply with WTO rules. (citizen.org)

The Financial Crisis: unorthodox thoughts


Grahame Thompson
The scale and character of the problems afflicting the finance sector need to be clarified if regulation is to work. This in turn makes posssible a more nuanced understanding of the “financial-crisis cycle”, argues Grahame Thompson.

The crisis in the international financial system is still unfolding and continued short-term policy firefighting is absolutely necessary. But what about the longer-term response: how should the authorities react in terms of new regulatory initiatives? The answer depends in part on an analysis of the nature of the crisis, and of what is happening in the system more generally.

Grahame Thompson is professor of political economy at the Open University. He is the co-author (with Paul Hirst) of Globalisation in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance (1999) and Between Hierarchies and Markets: The Logic and Limits of Network Forms of Organisation (2003)In addressing this more fundamental question, I want to propose two arguments that contest the dominant assumptions underlying much current commentary. The first is that this is not a “global” crisis at all - rather, it is almost exclusively confined to the United States and certain countries in northwestern Europe.

The second point follows: if the crisis is not global, this must be reflected both in the “geography” of the reactions to it and the character of any regulatory regime that might be installed in light of this sense of its scale.

The implication of these two arguments is, again, twofold: that the authorities’ emphasis should be on supranational regional responses rather than global ones per se; and that if financial crises are fundamentally “irrational” (driven by “excessive exuberances”, “animal spirits”, “bandwagon effects” and the like) then there is a need to prepare in quite a different way for the next crisis - because there will one.

The limits of the “global”

The first argument can be illustrated by noting the extent of the damage inflicted by the credit-crunch on commercial banks. This was estimated in early August 2008 as around $265 billion in terms of write-downs or outright failures. The sum has since increased by $25-$30bn after several large financial institutions were absorbed into other banks or effectively nationalised: among them Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, Lehmann Brothers, AIG, Bradford & Bingley, and Fortis.

These losses, taken together, have been incurred by thirty-five separate financial institutions. However, only one of these was outside of the United States or Europe (the National Bank of Australia, involving just under $1bn). There may be further failures and some contagion beyond the transatlantic world, but this is likely to be limited - as it has been so far.

What are the reasons for this concentration in the north Atlantic region? The main one is that this reflects the dominance in capital flows of this region and the “greater Europe” area (that is, the eurozone and other areas of western and eastern Europe, including Russia). Despite all the talk about the global nature of the crisis, some 70% of the world’s financial flows and domestic financial assets remain tethered to these two regions (see McKinsey Global Institute, Mapping Global Capital Markets: Fourth Annual Report: 2008). This suggests that there is not yet anywhere near a truly global financial system - and indeed I would suggest this is an impossible dream.

If the system were truly global then losses of this magnitude would already have had a devastating “global” impact on commercial banks in countries beyond the core regions affected - but this has not happened. The absence of this global impact is also rooted in the structural disjuncture between domestic and international financial systems - which will remain unbridgeable as long as there are different currencies tied to different domestic financial systems (in other words, while there is no single global currency); no proper global central bank to act as lender of last resort for this single currency; and only a few countries that can borrow on the international markets in their own currency to finance their economic activity, while the vast majority of other countries must borrow in someone else’s currency.

This is the structural basis of all the uncertainties and risks in the international financial system; and these conditions will not go away in the foreseeable future. These structural constraints inhibit the formation of a genuinely global financial system, leaving a much more differentiated system of national domestic and international financial relationships and interactions that need to be viewed in their specificity and singularity rather than as a single “system”.

The financial-innovation cycle

The lesson to be learned from this analysis is that further “global” rules to try to tame the financial beast are very unlikely to be successful. This is not an argument against strong regulation - but only against this regulation always being conceived as necessarily global in scope because the financial system is thought to be global. If it is not - and indeed will continue not to be so - then a different response is called for.

My analysis of the financial system - and of the “real” economy beyond — is that this still remains largely supranationally regional in organisation and not global (see PQ Hirst, G Thompson & S Bromley, Globalisation in Question [Polity, 3rd edition, 2008]). If this is so, a supranational regional response would be more sensible. This would allow for the responses to be tailored to the specific conditions and features of such regional or national financial configurations; enable agreement on what to do to be reached more easily, since fewer players are involved; and encourage “regulatory innovation”, since different frameworks would arise.

It is clear that the present financial crisis is deep and very serious. For the banking sector in particular it may be the worst crisis since the 1930s, and it threatens to spill over into the real economy of those countries most closely affected. But financial crises come and go - and the typical “financial-crisis cycle” as a whole contains regular phases and features that can be analytically useful. The phase involving “financial innovation”, a central part of present concerns, is an example.

Such financial innovation always raises many fears as it takes hold; these are well documented and discussed at the time, with warnings offered as to their likely downside effects, which however are never properly headed by authorities or regulators. This then leads to another phase as a crisis -brought about largely by these innovations - hits the system. This results in a great deal of firefighting where authorities try - amid a lot of hand-wringing, soul-searching and recrimination - to gain control of the crisis and prevent it spreading.

As the crisis subsides this is followed by a longer, analytical and diagnostic post-mortem phase: what were the reasons for the crisis; who or what was to blame; what lessons can be learned and what done to prevent a further crisis? This is a difficult phase because there is never agreement about causes or consequences. However, alongside or just behind it, the authorities begin to act, putting in place frameworks to discuss measures needed to prevent another crisis of this type.

This phase requires a political mobilisation to gather momentum amongst the affected parties - a difficult and lengthy process. Eventually, some consensus is reached, usually entailing a very watered-down and minimalist set of regulatory responses which is agreed and gradually implemented. Meanwhile, the system has moved on and a new set of financial innovations has taken hold - so the responses to the previous crisis now operating look as though they are unnecessary or addressing yesterday’s problem. Meanwhile, the fact that the authorities are still grappling with the regulatory consequences of that previous round of innovations means their focus is not on the existing round or the threats these now pose. So the cycle goes on…

The forms of regulation

I was once at a conference where I asked a panel of regulators and central-bank governors what could be done, if anything, to break this cycle. Their response was intriguing: they said that this was an “existential question” and that such questions could not be answered!

On reflection, however, I think this answer should be taken seriously. Perhaps the mindset of such bank governors and regulators is so focused on traditional responses that they cannot get out of this way of thinking and see that the system is actually “existential” in the sense that it is “irrational”. It is not, therefore, amenable to systematic and calculative responses, where the IMF or BIS simply begins another round of negotiations for a comprehensive and consistent set of new global regulatory norms and rules to be adhered to by everyone. Rather what is needed is a realisation that financial insecurity is going to continue (amid the exuberances and bandwagon effects referred to above) to be a fact of life. If this is so, what is needed is to organise a highly flexible regulatory regime of “distributed preparedness” and “system resilience”, that does not presume a single centre from which a new elaborate global regulatory regime emanates (see Collier & Lakoff, 2008).

This approach would have to pay particular attention to the necessarily fragmented nature of financial regulation in an attempt to forestall any exploitation of the gaps within it. This would involve a lot of contingency planning and attempts to coordinate the disparate array of “local” (supranationally-regional in this case) organisational and partial initiatives, requiring the application of improvisational skills and ingenuity. The task would be to map the vulnerabilities and network the relationship between them. And this regulatory world would always need to expect the unexpected.

Such a response is less likely than that the traditional financial-crisis cycle will recur. But imaginative thinking about the future - to try to create a robust alternative conception - is absolutely necessary, even if the precise terms of what has been suggested here proves wanting.

This article is published by Grahame Thompson, , and openDemocracy.net under a Creative Commons licence. You may republish it free of charge with attribution for non-commercial purposes following these guidelines. If you teach at a university we ask that your department make a donation. Commercial media must contact us for permission and fees. Some articles on this site are published under different terms.

PROSPEK INVESTASI DALAM TAHUN POLITIK


Menneg PPN/Kepala Bappenas, H. Paskah Suzetta menjadi keynote speaker dalam seminar Economic Outlook dalam rangka perayaan HUT ke-23 Harian Bisnis Indonesia, dengan tema "Prospek Investasi dalam Tahun Politik", pada Kamis (13/11) pukul 09.00 WIB, di Jakarta.

Dalam pidatonya, krisis finansial global yang saat ini sedang berlangsung, berdampak pada terjadinya krisis likuiditas. Oleh karena itu, upaya meningkatkan daya tarik investasi menjadi kebutuhan mendesak guna mendorong masuknya aliran investasi baik asing maupun domestik sebagai salah satu sumber pembiayaan pembangunan. Pada 2009 perlu diwaspadai terjadinya penurunan nilai investasi dan akan mengalami banyak tantangan sekaligus peluang untuk dapat meyakinkan calon investor untuk melakukan investasi dan ekspansi di Indonesia. Penciptaan iklim usaha melalui kebijakan yang memberi kepastian berusaha, peningkatan infrastruktur, pembangunan SDM, penguatan kelembagaan dan pemantapan koordinasi antarinstansi pemerintah dan pusat-daerah, serta penerapan prinsip-prinsip good governance harus terus diupayakan karena merupakan elemen utama dalam peningkatan iklim investasi.

"Adapun langkah-langkah kebijakan yang dilakukan pemerintah untuk meningkatkan iklim investasi yang kondusif dapat dikelompokkan sebagai berikut: 1) berbagai paket kebijakan perbaikan iklim investasi yang dimulai sejak tahun 2006 sampai paket kebijakan untuk program ekonomi 2008-2009; 2) landasan hukum pengembangan investasi dengan dikeluarkannya UU No. 25 tahun 2007 tentang penanaman modal; 3) kebijakan pemberian fasilitas fiskal untuk bidang usaha tertutup dan terbuka; 4) harmonisasi dan simplifikasi prosedur berinvestasi; dan 5) kebijakan pemberian insentif dan pemberian kemudahan penanaman modal di daerah," tambah Menneg PPN/Kepala Bappenas.

Hadir juga sebagai keynote speaker, Menneg BUMN, Sofyan Djalil, yang mengatakan bahwa tahun 2009 adalah tahun politik. Krisis keuangan global yang saat ini menjalar ke Indonesia, diperkirakan akan menjadi tantangan berat bagi incumbent. Meskipun semua tahu bahwa krisis di Indonesia ini tidak berasal dari internal, tapi dari eksternal yang berporos di AS, tapi pasti sangat sulit menjelaskannya kepada publik.

Acara yang dibuka oleh Pemimpin Umum Harian Bisnis Indonesia, Prof. Dr. H. Sukamdani S Gitosardjono tersebut dilanjutkan dengan diskusi yang menghadirkan narasumber dari berbagai kalangan, antara lain: Akbar Tandjung (politikus/Mantan Ketua DPR); Fahmi Idris (pemerintah/Menteri Perindustrian); Eep Saefulloh Fatah (Pengamat Politik); dan Rahmat Gobel (pengusaha/Wakil Ketua Umum Kadin Indonesia).

[Biro Humas dan TU Pimpinan BAPPENAS]

Perkuatan Perekonomian Daerah Dalam Rangka Mengantisipasi Kriss Finansial Global


Seluruh dunia tengah menghadapi krisis keuangan global. Keadaan ini agak kurang menguntungkan bagi kita, krisis terjadi justru di saat ekonomi kita menunjukan tanda-tanda pertumbuhan yang menggembirakan. Pada saat kita berhasil melepaskan diri dari berbagai tekanan akibat kenaikan harga-harga komoditas dan pada saat momentum pertumbuhan dapat kita tingkatkan, kembali kita harus berjuang dan mencurahkan segala daya untuk menghadapi gangguan yang datangnya dari luar. Perlu kiranya diketahui bahwa dalam beberapa tahun terakhir sebenarnya kita telah berhasil mempertahankan momentum pembangunan dengan cukup baik. Hal ini dapat dilihat dari capaian beberapa indikator pembangunan, antara lain menurunnya angka kemiskinan, menurunnya angka pengangguran, serta dapat dipertahankannya momentum pertumbuhan ekonomi.

Materi: Perkuatan Perekonomian Daerah Dalam Rangka Mengantisipasi Krisis Finansial Global (pdf)

Paparan :

BAPPENAS(pdf)
Kemenko Perekonomian(pdf)
Bank Indonesia(pdf)
Departemen Keuangan(pdf)
Kemenko Kesra(pdf)
Departemen Dalam Negeri(pdf)
BKPM/1(pdf)
BKPM/2(pdf)
LKPP(pdf)
Departemen Dalam Negeri(pdf)
Departemen Perdagangan(pdf)

Jebakan Pendidikan

perguruan tinggi

“Jebakan” pendidikan tinggi semakin mengkhawatirkan. Angka lulusan perguruan tinggi yang menjadi pengangguran naik dua kali lipat dari 5,7 persen pada 2004 menjadi 11,4 persen pada 2008. Pada 2004 lulusan perguruan tinggi 500 ribu orang, pada 2008 dua kali lipatnya jadi 1,1 juta orang. Jadi bisa dipastikan bahwa pasar tenaga kerja tetap stagnan sementara pasokan tenaga kerja berpendidikan tinggi semakin tinggi.

Salah satu cara untuk mengatasi masalah ini adalah mengutamakan relevansi pendidikan dengan kebutuhan tenaga kerja seperti dicontohkan Jepang.

”Membaca kebutuhan publik sangat penting, sehingga seperti di Jepang, pemerintah patut mengatur prioritas industri dengan didukung lembaga pendidikannya,” ujar Sekretaris Menteri Negara Riset dan Teknologi Benyamin Lakitan.

Salah satu contoh tidak relevannya dunia pendidikan adalah sebagai negara agraris, tapi dunia pendidikan agrarisnya merosot.

Akibat “Jebakan” Pengangguran Berlipat
Jakarta, Kompas - Tingkat pengangguran lulusan perguruan tinggi semakin meningkat akibat ”jebakan” pendidikan, karena para lulusan itu dibiarkan bersekolah, tetapi sulit mendapat pekerjaan. Dari tahun 2004, persentase pengangguran lulusan perguruan tinggi mencapai 5,7 persen dan berlipat dua pada 2008 menjadi 11,4 persen.

Demikian dikatakan Sekretaris Menteri Negara Riset dan Teknologi Benyamin Lakitan, Sabtu (1/11), di sela pembukaan Indonesia-Jepang Expo 2008 di arena Pekan Raya Jakarta Kemayoran, Jakarta.

”Upaya mencetak makin banyak tenaga terdidik memang penting, tetapi relevansi pendidikan jauh lebih penting,” kata Benyamin. Pada 2004, jumlah pengangguran lulusan perguruan tinggi sekitar 500.000 orang. Tahun 2008 menjadi dua kali lipatnya, 1,1 juta orang.

Menurut Benyamin, Jepang patut dicontoh. Pendidikan yang dikembangkan di sana sangat relevan dengan tujuan.

Pada salah satu sambutan pembukaan Indonesia-Jepang Expo 2008 yang diselenggarakan atas kerja sama Harian Kompas dan Nikkei dari Jepang, Pemimpin Umum Harian Kompas Jakob Oetama mengatakan, salah satu pemicu perkembangan yang membawa kemajuan pesat di Jepang adalah Restorasi Meiji.

Salah satu pesan penting dari Restorasi Meiji, seperti diutarakan Benyamin, pentingnya relevansi pendidikan dengan kebutuhan. ”Restorasi Meiji pemicu majunya teknologi melalui pendidikan yang relevan dengan tujuan, yaitu pendidikan dengan materi keilmuan dari dunia Barat kala itu,” kata Benyamin.

”Salah satu langkah dasar yang harus dibenahi di Indonesia saat ini adalah pengembangan riset keilmuan. Dikotomi riset dasar dan terapan seharusnya dihilangkan dan diubah menjadi curiousity driven research (riset mencari tahu) dan goal oriented researh (riset berorientasi tujuan),” kata Benyamin.

Indonesia sebagai negara agraris, tetapi dunia pendidikan agrarisnya justru merosot. Ini bukti lemahnya relevansi pendidikan dengan kebutuhan publik.

”Membaca kebutuhan publik sangat penting, sehingga seperti di Jepang, pemerintah patut mengatur prioritas industri dengan didukung lembaga pendidikannya,” ujar dia.

Pada zaman Meiji, saat terjadi pergolakan mencari identitas nasional (1885-1895), para generasi mudanya memutuskan mendalami berbagai kemajuan dunia Barat melalui pendidikan dengan mengedepankan tradisi Jepang.

Keandalan pengembangan nilai-nilai lokal Jepang saat ini sebetulnya diturunkan Jepang di Indonesia. Salah satunya, seperti disinggung Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono pada pembukaan kegiatan Indonesia-Jepang Expo 2008, adalah program Jogjatic di Yogyakarta: konsep satu desa satu produk.

Produk tersebut berasal dari potensi dan kearifan lokal un- tuk tujuan ekspor ke Jepang. Presiden ketika itu mengimbau supaya program Jepang ini diperluas ke wilayah provinsi lainnya. (NAW)

erwin — November 12, 2008 / 4:49 pm / mybusinessblogging.com

Kebebasan, Conditio Sine Quanon Moralitas

Oleh: Sukasah Syahdan
Jurnal Kebebasan: Akal dan Kehendak
Vol. II, Edisi 31, Tanggal 26 Mei 2008

alt text

Mana yang moral mana yang tidak di masyarakat dapat menjadi sesuatu yang bergerak, dapat menjadi dinamis, tidak selalu statis. Stephen Pinker saat menulis tentang hal ini menyinggung tentang tombol moralitas dalam diri manusia. Katanya kalau tombol ini sedang aktif, maka seluruh sistem penilaian rasional kita diambilalih secara drastis. Pertanyaan yang tidak ia jawab adalah: can we reason with morality?

Tulisan ini menjawab: ya. Tidak terlalu sulit membayangkan bahwa apa yang moral tidak jarang berlandas pada sesuatu yang rasional, ilmiah bahkan. Dalam contoh Pinker, isu merokok yang kini dianggap terbuktikan berbahaya juga bagi orang lain, kini cenderung berubah dari isu kesehatan menjadi moral. Atau pelacur cenderung mendapat “pemaafan” kolektif ketika eufimisme “pekerja seksual” diperkenalkan. Tombol moralitas yang disebutnya tidak lain seperangkat alat, kalau boleh disebut demikian, atau semacam shortcut yang telah kita ketahui, lewat pembelajaran/pengalaman, sebagai means dalam menentukan tujuan tertentu, untuk digunakan pada suatu titik waktu tertentu dan dalam konteks dan latar yang tertentu.

Pertanyaan yang amat penting adalah who should reason for our morality? Ini tidak ditanyakannya, sebab memang di luar pembahasan sang psikolog di atas. Dan hal ini saya jadikan pokok pembahasan yang akan saya coba lalukan dalam tulisan singkat ini.

Siapakah yang harus menentukan moralitas kita? Siapa yang harus menentukan yang baik dan buruk? Apakah diperlukan faktor eksternal untuk itu, sebagai juri paling tidak?

Salah satu keberatan orang terhadap perekonomian pasar erat terkait dengan isu baik-buruk ini. Orang yang cukup cermat akan menyimpulkan bahwa perekonomian pasar semata merupakan himpunan aneka hasil valuasi/penilaian individu. Yang lebih cermat lagi akan menyimpulkan: kalau sebagian dari himpunan ini ternyata tidak menyenangkan, maka kesalahannya terletak pada proses penilaian individu-individu tersebut, bukan pada sistem perekonomian.

Kalau argumennya stop di sini, tidak ada masalah konseptual. Namun, kalau si cermat dan si lebih cermat tadi lalu menarik implikasinya terlalu jauh dengan mengatakan bahwa justru di sinilah diperlukannya intervensi pemerintah, maka kegegabahannya dalam menalar harus dikatakan telah menindih segala cikal kecermatannya barusan.

Bahwa intervensi pemerintah diperlukan untuk memperbaiki ekses pilihan individu sering pula dianggap sebagai bukti kegagalan pasar. Dan kegagalan pasar dipercaya harus dikoreksi pemerintah. Dasarnya, dalam konteks kita sekarang, adalah immoralitas yang muncul akibat unbridled market mechanism, atau mekanisme pasar yang tidak dikekang, yang ditentang oleh sejumlah besar penulis dan pemikir besar, termasuk bahkan filsuf liberal semacam Isaiah Berlin.

Satu pertanyaan riil yang belum lama diajukan kepada saya memang demikian adanya: bagaimana mungkin kita bisa menyerahkan perekonomian kita pada para pebisnis yang rakus, serakah dan egois?

(Sebelum menjawab pertanyaan ini, saya ingin mengulas serba sedikit tentang “kegagalan pasar” sebagai sebuah istilah. Kegagalan pasar adalah istilah salah kaprah hasil analogi dari fenomena-fenomena mekanis. Kalau kegagalan jantung, maka sang jantung tidak bekerja sesuai tugasnya. Kegagalan mesin tidak akan mengantarkan kita pada tujuan. Kegagalan pasar secara ketat harus berarti bahwa kita tidak dapat melakukan transaksi.)

Jawaban saya: ini menyangkut problem moralitas manusia yang tidak perlu dikacaukan dengan sistem pengelolaan perekonomian. Pada dasarnya tiap manusia mampu menjadi jahat dan buruk. Sebut saja ini kodrat; yang tidak dapat dinafikan; yang mustahil dihilangkan. Malah kalau ada doktrin yg mau mencoba kemusykilan penyeragamannya, dia harus dicurigai, sebab hal tersebut tidak logis dan akan merupakan penyiaan sumber daya.

Ya, kita semua cenderung enggan disebut tamak, baik itu yang betul-betul tamak atau hanya sekadar ‘tamak’. Tapi setiap individu berhak ‘tamak’ dalam memilih cara terbaik untuk kepentingannya. Namun, dia tentu perlu ingat bahwa setiap pilihan ada konsekuensinya dan bahwa individu lain sama berhaknya. Masyarakat yang percaya kepada pasar bebas memiliki cara yang terbukti ampuh untuk meresolusi konflik yang mungkin timbul, yang paling andal adalah sistem penegakan hak milik pribadi, meskipun selama ini hanya ditegakkan sepotong-sepotong saja (atas dasar kekuatiran pada ketamakan tadi).

Sebagian dari hasil pilihan individual tidak bisa dipungkiri, memang kadang merupakan pilihan yang immoral, terutama dalam pengertian “normal” masyarakat kita saat ini. Masyarakat dikatakan cukup tak bermoral jika senang bermain judi ketimbang domino, atau minum minuman beralkohol ketimbang susu. Pemerintah dalam keyakinan sebagian pihak harus memperbaiki hal ini, atas asumsi bahwa masyarakart tidak dapat dipercaya mampu membuat pilihan yang baik bagi kepentingannya sendiri.

Tapi argumen ini adalah kontradiksi yang secara logis membunuh dirinya sendiri. Mengapa masyarakat dianggap tidak layak dipercaya mampu membuat pilihan-pilihan yang menyangkut penyelenggaraan hidupnya sehari-hari, sementara masyarakat yang sama layak dipercaya mampu memberikan pilihannya di saat pemilu terhadap para pemimpin yang mereka anggap secara moral lebih superior?

Sebaliknya, masyarakat yang menganjur-anjurkan pemerintahnya untuk mendikte perkara seperti ini adalah masyarakat yang menganjur-anjurkan pemerintah agar menjadi totaliter terhadap segala jenis pilihan dalam hidup mereka.

Kepada masyarakat dan pemerintah yang demikian hanya perlu diperlihatkan apakah anjuran tersebut secara logis dapat membawa kepada hasil akhir yang ingin dicapainya bersama. Dan di sini saya akan memanfaatkan tilikan praksiologis yang amat penting dari Murray Rothbard, seorang pemikir sosial yang pemikirannya belum banyak dikenal luas di negeri kita.

Kita misalkan saja suatu pemerintah ingin memajukan moralitas dan menghapuskan immoralitas di masyarakatnya. Asumsinya di sini adalah adanya moralitas obyektif, yang dapat diperdebatkan; namun, untuk tujuan pembahasan kali ini, kita terima saja. Yang menjadi pertanyaan mendasarnya adalah: Apakah moralitas masyarakat dapat dipromosikan lewat kekerasan?

Misalkan A, B dan C adalah tindakan-tindakan immoral, sedangkan X, Y, dan Z tindakan yang moral. Dan misalkan Ari Lossa seorang mahasiswa adalah pemabuk-pengonsumsi minuman beralkohol yang akut. Kita di sini ingin mengubah Ari menjadi orang yang bermoral. Bagaimana caranya? Menurut pada penganjur peran pemerintah, jawabannya adalah: melalui paksaan. Kalau perlu kita todong dia di bawah ancaman pistol agar tidak melakukan A. Maka, konon, ia akan menjadi bermoral.

Apakah perkaranya hanya sesederhana itu? Akankah Ari menjadi bermoral? Apakah ia berubah menjadi bermoral lantaran memilih X ketika peluangnya secara paksa dilucuti untuk memilih A? Kalau Ari Lossa berakhir di penjara semacam Roy Marten, apakah ia menjadi bermoral karena ia tidak sedang mabuk-mabukan?

Kalau begini pengertian kita tentang moralitas, maka sebagai konsep dan pegangan hidup dia menjadi tidak bermakna. Sebab moralitas hanya bermakna sejati ketika orang berhak memilih mana yang moral dan tidak. Kebebasan adalah kondisi yang harus ada bagi segala moralitas, dan cuma ada satu cara terbaik untuk mempromosikannya: persuasi.

Jika orang tidak bebas memilih, apabila ia dipaksa oleh unsur eksternal untuk melakukan hal yang moral, maka yang sebenarnya terjadi adalah ia kehilangan peluang untuk menjadi moral. Ia tidak diijinkan untuk mempertimbangkan sendiri alternatif-alternatif yang ada. Saat kebebasan seseorang dalam memilih ditiadakan, ia bertindak atas kehendak diktator ketimbang kehendaknya sendiri.

Solidarisme dan Laissez Faire

Jurnal Kebebasan: Akal dan Kehendak
Volume II Edisi No. 53 Tanggal 27 Oktober 2008
Oleh: Sukasah Syahdan

Pada mulanya solidaritas atau solidarisme* (S) sebagai doktrin politik berangkat dari visi yang mirip dengan ideal pasar bebas laissez faire (L). Semua individu anggota masyarakat sama berkepentingan dan punya memiliki kepentingan sama dalam berekonomi, dalam berumah-tangga sehari-hari. Rona egalitarian di kedua wajah masing-masing menyiratkan keyakinan bahwa penyelenggaran sistem ekonomi masyarakat paling baik adalah yang tidak memandang bulu, tidak memfavoritkan satu golongan di atas kelompok lain.

Romantisme idaman S diletakkannya di atas pengakuan bahwa produktivitas ditentukan oleh faktor-faktor produksi. Keyakinan S semakin mendalam dengan diperlihatkannya bukti-bukti nyata “kegagalan” doktrin induk yang lebih keras pada suatu masa yang belum terlalu jauh dari jaman kita, yang pernah ingin melenyapkan sepenuhnya individualitas ke dalam konstruk sosial masyarakat tanpa kelas. Dengan keyakinan barunya, kepemilikan terhadap faktor produksi tidak boleh diseragamkan secara komunal, sebab hal tersebut akan membuahkan petaka kemanusiaan dan kehancuran peradaban.

Sementara itu, dalam hal kinerja ekonomi, kelugasan L yang sering dikatakan “kasar” pula kurang romantik, adalah keandalan yang nyaris niscaya selalu dapat diulangnya; dia berpegang pada bukti, bukan janji, dan sejarah terbukti berpihak kepadanya sebagaimana teori yang solid dapat “mendahului” pengalaman di masa depan. Konsistensi L mengatakan kepada benak-benak yang mampu memahami keindahan pasar dalam “spontanitasnya”: tidak perlu ada seorang Ani untuk memerintah si Anu.

Kalaupun mereka yang meyakini L sering terkesan berbeda pandangan, itu cerminan konsekuensi logis dan ekspresi kemandirian akal dan kehendak bebas di dalam sistem di mana kebebasan dan supremasi individu tumbuh subur tanpa mengenal kultus kenabian individu atau kultus institusional manapun. Terlepas dari perbedaan dalam ekspresi-ekspresi tersebut, pada hakekatnya semua setuju akan satu hal: perlunya meminimasi struktur pemerintahan. Sebagian memandang perlu minarkisme, sebagian menampik sepenuhnya pemerintahan untukmemeluk anarkisme. Tugas pemerintahan terbatas untuk melindungi hak milik pribadi dan kebebasan berekonomi si Ani, si Anu dan jutaan individu lain seperti mereka.

Hingga pada suatu ketika S berkata, “Maaf L, tatanan sosial berdasarkan kepemilikan pribadi semata sebagaimana kamu yakini, kuragukan mampu merealiasikan mimpi-mimpiku.” Di persimpangan jalan itu mereka bertatapan.

Sejumlah “pandito” gadungan pendukung S di tepi jalan bersorak sambil meneriaki bahwa L tidak punya mekanisme built ini untuk mengatasi kesenjangan dalam berproduksi. L tidak bisa mendistribusi hasil produksi secara adil, kata mereka, entah dari mana datangnya kesimpulan ini sebab ilmu kepanditaan sejati justru menyimpulkan sebaliknya. Namun, S pun seperti mendapat justifikasinya. Terus berjalan bersama adalah kemustahilan, demikian simpulnya, yang langsung diamini para pandito.

Sebagai varian doktrin egalitarian yang menekankan equality, S mengibaratkan kehidupan dengan perlombaan di mana atas nama prinsip keadilan atau fairness setiap peserta harus berbekal sepadan dan memulai dari titik awal yang sama. Doktrin perlindungan terhadap hak milik pribadi semata dianggap tidak mampu memenuhi prinsip ini. Karenanya, diperlukan aturan-aturan khusus dari institusi yang khusus pula.

Kata sebagian pendukung S, visi ini adalah pengejaran yang moral. Perlu jalur legal berupa ayoman pemerintah. Pemerintah adalah hukum, maka salah atau benar, sepak terjangnya senantiasa legal. Agar konstitusi lebih dari sekadar alat, dia butuh sakralisasi lewat mitos, sanksi atau koersi. Banyak pula yang menambahkan, sebaiknya S dipermantap dengan dalil-dalil teologis. Mewajibkan orang lain untuk menyerahkan sedikit banyak hak milik untuk menolong sesama itu patut didukung lewat metode apapun. Demikian S merangkul eklektisme untuk perjuangan sebuah moral cause bersama.

*

Mungkin berlebihan dan agak mengejutkan jika sekonyong-konyong disimpulkan di sini bahwa implementasi doktrin egalitarian S oleh negara akan berakhir sebagai proyek-proyek yang mengerdilkan individu manusia, sebagai satu-satunya makluk yang mengenal moralitas, dalam mengexercise kemanusiaannya. Namun, begitulah kesimpulan praksiologisnya. Tinjauan lebih jauh dan contoh blunder legislasi terhadap hal ini telah dibahas (di sini dan di sini) dalam Jurnal ini.

Akhirnya, pertanyaan-pertanyaan seputar pengejaran S oleh negara harus dikembalikan kepada pendukungnya, termasuk para pandito yang mengklaim bahwa perekonomian laissez faire hampa moralitas dan tidak mengenal mekanisme keadilan. Apakah yang moral dari tindakan yang berasal dari ketiadaan pilihan? Apakah yang etis dalam suatu keharusan di bawah ancaman? Di mana letak keadilannya?

Sebagaimana pernah dinyatakan oleh Frédéric Bastiat, seorang ekonom yang berasal dari sebuah negeri di mana S berupa Fraternity pernah nyaring digaungkan:[1]

“Jika setiap orang berhak mempertahankan-bahkan dengan menggunakan kekerasan-dirinya sendiri, kebebasan dan hak miliknya, maka dapat disimpulkan bahwa sekelompok orang juga berhak berorganisasi dan menggalang kekuatan bersama untuk melindungi hak-hak tersebut secara konstan. Maka prinsip hak kolektif-sebagai alasan bagi keberadaan dan legalitasnya sendiri-didasari pada hak individu. Dan himpunan kekuatan bersama yang bertujuan melindungi hak kolektif tersebut secara logis tidak memiliki alasan ataupun misi lain apapun kecuali untuk kepentingan yang disubstitusikannya. Dengan demikian, oleh karena seorang individu tidak dapat secara legal mengambil secara paksa diri, kebebasan atau hak milik seorang individu lainnya, maka himpunan kekuatan bersama-atas alasan yang sama-juga tidak dapat secara legal digunakan untuk menghancurkan diri, kebebasan dan hak milik individu atau kelompok lain.”